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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
)
V.
)
BRENDA KC AUTREY,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)
STATE OF IDAHO,

NOS. 46163-2018, 46164-2018, & 46165-2018
KOOTENAI COUNTY NOS. CR-2018-3625
CR-2014-9083 & CR-2014-13417
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After Brenda KC Autrey pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, the district
court sentenced her to five years, with three years fixed. The district court also revoked her
probation in two other cases and imposed her underlying concurrent sentences of five years, with
two years fixed. The district court later denied Ms. Autrey' s motions to reduce her sentences
under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 ("Rule 35"). Ms. Autrey now appeals. She argues the district court
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence, revoking her probation, and denying her
Rule 3 5 motion.
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In June 2014, Ms. Autrey entered an Alford1 plea to burglary. (No. 46164 R., 2 p.48.) The
district court released her on her own recognizance pending sentencing. (No. 46164 R., p.48.)
While on release, Ms. Autrey possessed a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and drug
paraphernalia, and the State charged her with these offenses in a separate case. (No. 46165
R., pp.40--41.) In March 2015, the district court held a joint hearing in both cases. (No. 46164
R., p.58; No. 46165 R., p.52.) For the burglary offense, the district court placed Ms. Autrey on
probation, with an underlying sentence of five years, with two years fixed. (No. 46164 R., pp.6366.) The district court also ordered her to complete drug court. (No. 46164 R., p.64.) In drug
court, Ms. Autrey pled guilty to the two drug offenses. (No. 46165 PSI, p.16.) In June 2015,
Ms. Autrey was discharged from drug court. (No. 46165 PSI, p.20.) The next month, Ms. Autrey
admitted to violating her probation in the burglary case. (No. 46164 R., p.87.) In the drug case,
the district court sentenced her to five years, with two years fixed. (No. 46165 R., pp.55, 57.)
The district court retained jurisdiction ("a rider") in both cases. (No. 46164 R., pp.88-90; No.
46165 R., pp.56-58.)
In February 2016, the district court held a rider review hearing and placed Ms. Autrey on
probation in both cases. (No. 46164 R., pp.91, 93-94; No. 46165 R., pp.60, 62-64.) In August
2016, Ms. Autrey admitted to violating her probation, and the district court imposed additional
terms and conditions. (No. 46164 R., pp.111-12, 114-15; No. 46165 R., pp.81-82, 84-85.) In
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North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
In this consolidated appeal, there are three separate records. Citations to the clerk's record and
confidential exhibits (cited as "PSI") will reference the Supreme Court Docket Number. There
are only two transcripts on appeal, however. The first transcript, cited as Volume I, contains a
joint entry of plea and admit/deny hearing, held on April 10, 2018, and a joint sentencing and
disposition hearing, held on June 4, 2018. The second transcript, cited as Volume II, contains the
Rule 35 motion hearing, held on November 2, 2018.
2
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February 2017, Ms. Autrey admitting to violating her probation again, and the district court
revoked her probation, imposed her sentences, and retained jurisdiction. (No. 46164 R., pp.134,
135, 136–38; No. 46165 R., pp.119, 120, 121–23.) In September 2017, the district court held
another rider review hearing and placed Ms. Autrey back on probation. (No. 46164 R., pp.139,
140–41; No. 46165 R., pp.124, 125–26.)
About six months later, the State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Ms. Autrey
committed the crime of possession of a controlled substance (heroin). (No. 46163 R., pp.8–9.)
The State also alleged a persistent violator sentencing enhancement. (No. 46163 R., p.9.)
Ms. Autrey waived a preliminary hearing, and the magistrate bound her over to district court.
(No. 46163 R., pp.27–28.) The State charged her by Information with possession of a controlled
substance and the sentencing enhancement. (No. 46163 R., pp.30–31.) Consequently, the State
moved to revoke her probation in the other cases. (No. 46164 R., p.163; No. 46165 R., p.147.)
At a joint hearing in April 2018, Ms. Autrey pled guilty to possession of a controlled
substance in the new case. (Tr. Vol. I, p.12, L.24–p.13, L.3, p.14, L.17–p.15, L.6.) The State
agreed to dismiss the sentencing enhancement. (Tr. Vol. I, p.4, Ls.23–25.) Ms. Autrey also
admitted to violating her probation in both cases. (Tr. Vol. I, p.17, L.11–p.18, L.9.)
The district court held a joint sentencing and disposition hearing in June 2018. (See
generally Tr. Vol. I, p.22, L.1–p.33, L.5.) For the new offense of possession of a controlled
substance, the State recommended a sentence of six years, with three years fixed, to be served
concurrent to the underlying sentences in Ms. Autrey’s prior cases. (Tr. Vol. I, p.23, Ls.19–23.)
Ms. Autrey requested the district court place her on probation (Tr. Vol. I, p.26, Ls.17–18.) For
the new offense, the district court sentenced her to five years, with three years fixed, to be served
concurrently. (Tr. Vol. I, p.31, Ls.1–7.) The district court also revoked her probation and
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imposed the underlying concurrent sentences of five years, with two years fixed. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.31, Ls.4-6.) The district court entered a judgment in each case. (No. 46164 R., pp.214-15; No.
46165 R., pp.183-84; No. 46163 R., pp.44--46, 49-51 (amended judgment).)
Ms. Autrey then moved for reconsideration of her sentences pursuant to Rule 35. (No.
46164 R., p.217; No. 46165 R., p.186; No. 46163 R., p.47.) Ms. Autrey also filed timely notices
of appeal. (No. 46164 R., pp.219-21; No. 46165 R., pp.188-90; No. 46163 R., pp.52-54.)
In November 2018, the district court held a Rule 35 motion hearing. (See generally
Tr. Vol. II, p.4, L.5-p.13, L.16.) Ms. Autrey testified, and she requested that the district court
reduce her fixed time to two years. (Tr. Vol. II, p.5, L.10-p.8, L.24, p.9, Ls.17-19.) The district
court denied her motions. (Tr. Vol. II, p.11, Ls.6-7; No. 46164 R., p.247; No. 46165 R., p.218;
No. 46163 R., p.82.)

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of five
years, with three years fixed, upon Ms. Autrey, following her guilty plea to possession of
a controlled substance in No. 46163?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Ms. Autrey's probation in
Nos. 46164 and 46165?

III.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Autrey's Rule 35 motion in
No. 46163?3

3

Ms. Autrey does not appeal from the district court's order denying her Rule 35 motions in Nos.
46164 and 46165. At the Rule 35 motion hearing, Ms. Autrey requested that the district court
reduce her fixed time to two years. (Tr. Vol. II, p.5, L.10-p.8, L.24, p.9, Ls.17-19.) Ms. Autrey's
fixed time in Nos. 46164 and 46165 is already two years. (See No. 46164 R., p.214; No. 46165
R., p.183.) Because Ms. Autrey already received this requested sentence in Nos. 46164 and
46165, she does not challenge the district court's denial of her Rule 35 motions in those cases.
4

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Five Years,
With Three Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Autrey, Following Her Guilty Plea To Possession Of A
Controlled Substance In No. 46163
"It is well-established that ' [w ]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence."' State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Ms. Autrey's sentence does not exceed the statutory
maximum. See LC. § 37-2732(c) (seven year maximum). Accordingly, to show that the sentence
imposed was unreasonable, Ms. Autrey "must show that the sentence, in light of the governing
criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460
(2002).
"'Reasonableness' of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed." State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.

Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. "A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution." State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011). Similarly,
"[t]he choice of probation, among available sentencing alternatives, is committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court .... " State v. Landreth, 118 Idaho 613, 615 (Ct. App. 1990).
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Here, Ms. Autrey asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, she contends the district court
should have sentenced her to a lesser term of imprisonment or probation in light of the mitigating
factors, including her substance abuse issues, amenability towards treatment, and acceptance of
responsibility.
Twenty-nine-year-old Ms. Autrey had a tumultuous childhood. Her parents fought a lot,
so she went to live with her grandparents. (No. 46163 PSI, p.10.) Ms. Autrey had anger issues
and eventually she went back to live with her parents. (No. 46163 PSI, p.10.) Her parents had a
“drug [and] drinking problem” and “fought pretty consistently.” (No. 46163 PSI, p.10.) In
addition, Ms. Autrey was sexually abused by a relative and, from age twelve to eighteen, in an
unhealthy, abusive relationship with a man who was nine years older than her. (No. 46163 PSI,
p.10, 12.) Ms. Autrey started running away and was using drugs by age eleven. (No. 46163 PSI,
pp.10, 16.) She has struggled with substance abuse ever since. (No. 46163 PSI, pp.15–16.) She
has used methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin intravenously for a number of years. (No. 46163
PSI, p.16.) Most recently, she was using methamphetamine and heroin multiple times a day. (No.
46163 PSI, pp.15–16.) Ms. Autrey’s substance abuse issues, the impact of her substance abuse
on her behavior, and her need for treatment are strong factors in mitigation. A sentencing court
should give “proper consideration of the defendant’s alcoholic problem, the part it played in
causing defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem.”
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). The impact of substance abuse on the defendant’s
criminal conduct is “a proper consideration in mitigation of punishment upon sentencing.”
State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 n.5 (1981). Here, Ms. Autrey’s life-long substance abuse
issues support a more lenient sentence.
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Additionally, Ms. Autrey’s instant offense was the result of her relapse, and she was
amenable towards treatment. (Tr. Vol. I, p.26, L.24–p.27, L.1.) Before her relapse, Ms. Autrey
had a job at Carl’s Jr. (No. 46163 PSI, p.14.) Ms. Autrey reported that she felt “[l]ike an idiot”
about the offense. (No. 46163 PSI, p.4.) Her goal was to “get clean so she can start a family with
someone.” (No. 46163 PSI, p.17.) In a letter to the district court, she took “full accountability”
for her actions. (No. 46163 R., p.38.) She had no excuses for her relapse and was embarrassed
and

disappointed

with

herself.

(No.

46163

R.,

p.38.)

While

in

jail

pending

sentencing/disposition, Ms. Autrey realized that she wanted more for her life than being in and
out of custody. (No. 46163 R., p.38.) Her plan for probation included 90 NA/AA meetings in 90
days, mandatory weekly UAs, classes at Abundant Wellness, weekly meetings with her
probation officer, counseling, and obtaining employment. (No. 46163 R., p.38.) Similarly,
Ms. Autrey told the district court at sentencing that she was interested in Abundant Wellness’s
counseling and classes. (Tr. Vol. I, p.28, Ls.19–25.) Ms. Autrey also submitted a letter of support
from her fiancé. (No. 46163 R., pp.36–37.) He wrote that he had a job lined up for her upon her
release. (No. 46163 R., p.36.) He also wrote that he would make sure that she attended all
meetings, classes, and any other probation conditions. (No. 46163 R., p.36.) Ms. Autrey’s
amenability to treatment, renewed commitment to sobriety, and acceptance of responsibility
stand in favor of mitigation.
In summary, Ms. Autrey submits the district court failed to exercise reason and thus
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence in No. 46163. Proper consideration of
the mitigating circumstances support a lesser sentence or probation.
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Ms. Autrey's Probation In
Nos. 46164 and 46165
The district court is empowered by statute to revoke a defendant's probation under
certain circumstances. I.C. §§ 19-2602, -2603, 20-222. The Court uses a two-step analysis to
review a probation revocation proceeding. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). First, the
Court determines "whether the defendant violated the terms of his probation." Id. Second, "[i]f it
is determined that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his probation," the Court
examines "what should be the consequences of that violation." Id. The determination of a
probation violation and the determination of the consequences, if any, are separate analyses. Id.
Here, Ms. Autrey's does not challenge her admissions to violating her probation.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.17, L.11-p.18, L.9.) "When a probationer admits to a direct violation of her
probation agreement, no further inquiry into the question is required." State v. Peterson, 123
Idaho 49, 50 (Ct. App. 1992). Rather, Ms. Autrey submits that the district court abused its
discretion by revoking her probation.
"After a probation violation has been proven, the decision to revoke probation and
pronounce sentence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court." State v. Roy, 113 Idaho
388, 392 (Ct. App. 1987). "A judge cannot revoke probation arbitrarily," however. State v. Lee,
116 Idaho 38, 40 (Ct. App. 1989). "The purpose of probation is to give the defendant an
opportunity to be rehabilitated under proper control and supervision." State v. Mummert, 98
Idaho 452, 454 (1977). "In determining whether to revoke probation a court must consider
whether probation is meeting the objective of rehabilitation while also providing adequate
protection for society." State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275 (Ct. App. 1995). The court may
consider the defendant's conduct before and during probation. Roy, 113 Idaho at 392.
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In this case, Ms. Autrey submits that the district court abused its discretion by revoking
her probation because her probation was achieving its rehabilitative objective. Although
Ms. Autrey relapsed, culminating with the new charge, she maintains that the district court
should have reinstated her on probation for treatment in the community. In support of her
argument, she respectfully refers this Court to her argument in Part I. She contends that those
mitigating factors show that she could be a successful candidate on probation, and the district
court therefore abused its discretion by revoking her probation Nos. 46164 and 46165.

III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Autrey's Rule 35 Motion In
No. 46163
"A Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is essentially a plea for leniency, addressed
to the sound discretion of the court." State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903 (Ct. App. 2014). In
reviewing the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, the Court must "consider the entire record and
apply the same criteria used for determining the reasonableness of the original sentence." Id. The
Court "conduct[s] an independent review of the record, having regard for the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest." State v. Burdett,
134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000). "Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce
a sentence under Rule 35," the Court's scope ofreview "includes all information submitted at the
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to reduce." State v.
Araiza, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985). "When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant
must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
203 (2007).
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Here, Ms. Autrey submits the district court abused its discretion by declining to reduce
her sentence for No. 46163 to two years fixed plus three years indeterminate. Ms. Autrey
provided new and additional information to support this fixed time reduction in her sentence.
Ms. Autrey testified that she hoped for a year off her fixed time so she could get transferred to
East Boise “and get a job in the community.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.6, Ls.11–15.) Ms. Autrey was
currently working at a fruit farm making $1.65/hour, which just kept her “afloat” to be able to
call family “and all that.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.7, Ls.1–4, p.8, Ls.1–2.) If she was transferred to East
Boise, she could make at least $12.00/hour. (Tr. Vol. II, p.8, Ls.2–3.) Ms. Autrey wanted to save
money before her release in order to be successful on parole. (Tr. Vol. II, p.6, Ls.15–18.) In
addition, due to her three-year fixed time, Ms. Autrey was not eligible for programming until
2020. (Tr. Vol. II, p.6, Ls.24–25.) Ms. Autrey also informed the district court that she was about
one month away from obtaining her GED. (Tr. Vol. II, p.7, Ls.7–12.) Ms. Autrey maintains this
new and additional information supported a reduction in her sentence in No. 46163. She asserts
the district court abused its discretion by denying her Rule 35 motion.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Autrey respectfully requests this Court reduce her sentences in Nos. 46163, 46164,
and 46165 as it deems appropriate. Alternatively, she respectfully requests this Court vacate the
district court's judgment of conviction in No. 46163 and its orders revoking probation in
Nos. 46164 and 46165 and remand these cases to the district court for a new sentencing and
disposition hearing. In the alternative, she respectfully requests this Court vacate the district
court's order denying her Rule 35 motion in No. 46163 and remand that case for a Rule 35
motion hearing.
DATED this 2nd day of April, 2019.

Isl Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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